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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking observations in consumer markets is the existence of substantial
price dispersion for seemingly identical products. In his classic model of sales, Varian
(1980) shows how price dispersion in a homogeneous-product market arises due to the
presence of consumers who are uninformed about market prices. Price-setting rms balance
their incentives to compete for the informed consumers who will pay the lowest price and
to exploit the uninformed consumers who each purchase from a randomly selected seller,
producing an equilibrium price distribution.1 The behavior of the uninformed consumers
can be justied as their having prohibitively high search cost to nd the price of a second
seller. Alternatively, as Ellison (2006) notes, the uniformed consumers in Varians model
can be viewed as being boundedly rationaltheir reservation price is set at their product
valuation, which may not be optimal.
An alternative approach to understanding price dispersion is through models of optimal
search. Stahl (1989) considers a model that is similar to Varian (1980) except that all
the uninformed consumers search optimally given their (not too high) search cost. In
equilibrium, rms price according to a probability distribution function (much as in Varian);
the informed consumers (whom Stahl calls shoppers who have zero search cost) will pay
the lowest price, whereas the uninformed consumers will engage in optimal price search,
sampling sellers sequentially with an optimal reservation price. An important contribution
of the paper is to bridge the Bertrand equilibrium of marginal cost pricing and the Diamond
equilibrium of monopoly pricing (Diamond, 1971) in a unied model of optimal consumer
search: equilibrium prices monotonically decrease in consumer search cost and converge to
marginal cost when search cost goes to zero, whereas the Diamond outcome obtains in the
limit when the portion of consumers with strictly positive search costs approaches 1.
While these two inuential papers and the related literature have o¤ered signicant in-
sights on equilibrium price competition and dispersion,2 the startling di¤erent behaviors of
1See also Rosenthal (1981) for a related original contribution.
2The literature on price dispersion that originates from Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980) has come
to be known as the clearinghouse approach, after the more general model of Baye and Morgan (2001), as
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the uninformed consumers in the two models are perhaps best viewed as capturing di¤erent
aspects of the reality: although some consumers may conduct optimal sequential search,
who anticipate correctly the equilibrium price distribution and set an optimal reservation
price, there may also be other consumers who behave as the uninformed consumers in
Varian (1980), searching with a limited scope. It would be desirable to incorporate these
heterogeneous searchers in a unied and yet tractable model.
In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model of oligopolistic pricing in homogeneous-
product markets with heterogeneous searchers. Each consumer demands at most one unit
of the product. As in Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), some consumers are informed and will
purchase from the seller with the lowest price, while others are uninformed about market
prices. The uninformed consumes will search for price information: some of whom are what
we shall call global searchers, who search sequentially with recall (as in Stahl, 1989) and who
follow an optimal reservation price that is generally below their product valuation; whereas
the others are what we shall call local searchers, who search only once and purchase if the
price does not exceed their product valuation. As in Varian, these local searchers can be
viewed either as having prohibitively high cost for searching beyond once,3 or as boundedly
rational (henceforth BR) searchers whose reservation price is not derived from the equilib-
rium price distribution (but is rationalizable).4 When all uninformed consumers are local
searchers, our model reduces to that of Varian (1980); when all uninformed consumers are
global searchers, the model is the same as Stahl (1989).5 By varying the uninformed con-
sumers between these two types and by allowing both interpretations of the local searchers,
opposed to the approach of optimal (sequential) search with strategic rms that Stahl (1989) examplies (see
Reinganum, 1979 for another original contribution. Search models with xed sample sizes include Burdett
and Judd, 1983; and Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2004). Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006) provides an
excellent review of the literature.
3With this interpretation, our model is complementary to Stahl (1996), which considers search costs that
follow an absolutely continuous distribution.
4The local searchers can also be boundedly rationality due to their loyalty to a particular seller, as in
Rosenthal (1980). Our analysis remains valid with this alternative interpretation of the local searchers.
5Stahl (1989) considers a downward-sloping demand curve for each consumer. For convenience, we assume
unit demand, but our analysis can be extended to admit elastic demand.
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our model combines the two approaches and provides a convenient framework to study how
heterogeneity among searchers a¤ects equilibrium outcomes.
In equilibrium, there is price dispersion due to rms adopting mixed strategies, and the na-
ture of the equilibrium depends on how the value of the product di¤ers from a benchmark
the optimal reservation price by global searchers if there were no local searchers, which in
turn is an increasing function of the global searcherssearch cost. For high-value products,
for which local searchersreservation price exceeds the benchmark by a large amount, the
equilibrium is a mixture distribution, where rms randomize between a high-price distrib-
ution and a low-price distribution, placing zero probability on an interval of intermediate
prices. By adopting this clustered pricing strategy, rms swing between targeting the local
searchers and global searchers, and equilibrium prices are higher in this case than if there
were no local searchers. Another interesting feature of the equilibrium in this region of
parameter values is that, unlike in Stahl (1989), global searchers may indeed search more
than once and hence there is true equilibrium sequential search.
For low-value products, for which local searchersreservation price departs from (exceed-
ing or falls short of) the benchmark by a relatively small amount, the equilibrium has the
feature familiar in the literature, where rms adopt unclustered pricing, namely that the
equilibrium price distribution has positive density (i.e., has no gap) on the entire support.
Remarkably, in this case equilibrium prices are either not a¤ected by or are lower due to the
presence of local searchers. Our results thus provide testable predictions of how the nature
of equilibrium price dispersion depends on the value of the product relative to search costs.
Our analysis also reveals some intriguing comparative statics. Unlike Stahl (1989), which
predicts that prices monotonically decrease as search costs become lower, in our model
prices can increase as the search cost for the global searchers decreases, holding other
parameters of the model constant. When the equilibrium involves a mixture distribution,
a lower search cost would lower the global searchersoptimal reservation price, making it
less protable for rms to target them. Consequently, rms increase the probability of
choosing high prices that target the local searchers, resulting in higher expected prices in
the market. Furthermore, as this search cost goes to zero, global searchers reservation
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price will approach zero and they will e¤ectively search all sellers; but equilibrium price
dispersion persists. In fact, in this case the equilibrium price distribution converges to that
in Varian (1980) with the mass of uninformed consumers equal to that of local searchers.
Our ndings o¤er a simple explanation of the puzzling observations that prices for many
products do not seem to be lower on the Internet than in conventional markets and that
substantial price dispersion remains in the Internet market, although Internet appears to
have substantially lowered search cost.6 We may consider the local searchers in our model
as those who have high search cost, because they lack the access to the low-cost search
technology made possible by the Internet (e.g., they may not have a computer or may not
have Internet access). Then, the low search cost to nd prices through the Internet need
not reduce prices and reduce price dispersion.7 In this sense, the Digital Divide" not only
raises an equity issue, it also has important implications for market e¢ ciency. Our model
thus complements other recent studies that o¤er alternative explanations (e.g., Baye and
Morgan, 2001; Baye and Morgan, 2004; and Ellison and Ellison, 2008).
If we interpret the local searchers as BR consumers, our paper is related to a small but
growing literature that models bounded rationality in the study of industrial organization.8
As in the literature, the BR consumers in our model can have either positive or negative
externalities on the rational consumers. However, in our model a relatively small departure
by some consumers from optimizing behavior either does not a¤ect the equilibrium or
benets all consumers, including the BR consumers themselves.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Sections 3
characterizes equilibrium price distribution. Section 4 analyzes comparative statics. Section
5 discusses the implications of considering local searchers as BR consumers. Section 6
concludes. All formal proofs are relegated to an appendix.
6See, for example, Baye and Morgan (2004), Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006), and Ellison and Ellison
(2005) for discussions of evidence.
7Similarly, if local searchers are boundedly rational, the low search cost on the Internet need not reduce
prices and price dispersion.
8See Armstrong and Chen (2009), Baye and Morgan (2004), Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
and Spiegler (2006) for examples of recent work, and Ellison (2006) for an insightful review of the literature.
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2. THE MODEL
There are N  2 rms, producing a homogeneous product with a constant marginal
cost that is normalized to zero. Firms simultaneously and independently set their prices.
As in the literature, we will consider only symmetric equilibrium and assume that each
rm randomly chooses a price from a probability distribution function: if the distribution
function reduces to a single point, then each rm chooses a pure strategy; otherwise the
rm adopts a mixed strategy.
The market has a unit mass of consumers, each demanding one unit of the product.
They make choices after rms set prices. Portion  2 (0; 1) of the consumers are informed
about all rmsprices in the market,9 whereas portion 1  of the consumers are (initially)
uninformed about prices in the market. The informed consumers will always buy from a
seller with the lowest price, while the uninformed consumers will engage in price search. As
is commonly assumed in the literature, the rst search has zero cost but each additional
search incurs a positive search cost. Portion  2 [0; 1] of the uninformed consumers are
global searchers, who conduct optimal search sequentially with recall and with search cost
s > 0; portion 1   are local searchers who will only search one seller and purchase if the
price does not exceed their valuation for the product. Thus, the local searchers are the
same as the uninformed consumers in Varian (1980), whereas the global searchers are the
sequential searchers in Stahl (1989). As in Varian, there are two possible interpretations for
the local searchers. They can be viewed as optimal searchers, same as the global searchers,
but have a su¢ ciently high search cost; perhaps because they have no access to some low-
cost search technology (e.g., a computer or access to the Internet). Alternatively, these may
be BR searchers, who have search cost s but have chosen their product valuation as the
reservation price, which may or may not be optimal given the equilibrium price distribution.
We shall see that an attractive feature of our model is that the equilibrium price distribution
will be the same under either interpretation of the local searchers. Hence we shall allow
9As Stahl (1989) suggests, these can be consumers who have zero search cost and even enjoy shopping
around.
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both interpretations and discuss their potentially di¤erent implications.
We assume that local searchersproduct valuation is b and all other consumersproduct
valuation is V; where ~b < b < 11 V and b^ (< V )) is the lower bound on b to be dened
later. Hence, a special case is b = V; but we also allow local searchers to have somewhat
di¤erent product valuation from other consumers.10 The key parameters of our model are
b; V; ; ; and s: A (symmetric) equilibrium is a price distribution function  (p) and a
reservation price r by the global searchers such that, given r; b; and other rms adopting
 (p) ; it is optimal for each rm to choosing  (p) ; and given  (p) ; it is optimal for global
searchers to search sequentially with reservation price r:
By familiar arguments (e.g., Varian, 1980; and Stahl, 1989), the game has no pure-
strategy equilibrium, and the equilibrium price distribution  (p) is atomless on its entire
support.
Denote the upper limit of the support for  (p) by p^: Then, p^  max fb; rg ; since a rm
will earn zero prot by pricing abovemax fb; rg : Also, p^  min fb; rg ; since if p^ < min fb; rg ;
a rm would sell to the same number of consumers pricing higher at min fb; rg as pricing
at p^: Furthermore, it cannot be true that min fb; rg < p^ < max fb; rg ; because if it were
the case, a rm would sell to the same number of consumers pricing higher at max fb; rg as
pricing at p^. We thus have:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the upper limit of the support for  (p) is either the local searchers
reservation price b or the global searchersreservation price r.
Before proceeding to the analysis of our model, we discuss two of its special cases. If
 = 0; then our model reduces to that of Varian (1980), where all the uninformed consumers
purchase from a randomly selected seller if the price does not exceed their valuation b: The
10As it will become clear later, for b  V; our analysis will be entirely the same as b = V ; but b < V
allows us to consider an additional case of interest. The local searchers may have lower product valuation
than the global searchers, for instance, if the local searchers are low-income consumers who lack access to a
new search technology, such as a computer or Internet access.
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equilibrium price distribution in this case is
F v (p) = 1 

1  
N
(
b
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
with
1  
1 + (N   1)b  p  b: (1)
If  = 1; then our model reduces to that of Stahl (1989); the equilibrium price distribution
and reservation price by the global searchers are uniquely given by, respectively:
G(p; rg) = 1 

1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
with
1  
1 + (N   1)rg  p  rg; (2)
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
(rg   p)dG(p; rg) = s; (3)
provided that rg  V: All rms simultaneously choose prices according to c.d.f. G (p; rg) ;
and all uninformed consumers search sequentially with recall under the optimally chosen
reservation price rg; stopping search only when she has found a price p  rg or when she
has searched all sellers (in which case she purchases from the seller with the lowest price).
Since Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
(rg   p)dG(p; rg) =
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
G(p; rg)dp! 0 as rg ! 0;
and the partial derivative of the left-hand side of (3) with respect to rg is
1 +
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
dG(p; rg)
dp

  p
rg

dp > 1 
Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
dG(p; rg)
dp
dp = 0; (4)
rg  V is satised when s is small relative to V , which is assumed to hold throughout our
analysis.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3), we have:
@rg
@
< 0 and
@rg
@s
> 0: (5)
That is, if all uninformed consumers are global searchers, their optimal reservation price
decreases in the portion of informed consumers but increase in search cost.
Our analysis will depend importantly on how b di¤ers from rg:We shall divide the possible
values of b into three connected and mutually exclusive regions: (i) b > rg1  ; (ii)
rg
1   b 
rg; and (iii) rg > b  b^; where b^ is the lower bound on b that we will dene later in Lemma
2.
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3. EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISTRIBUTION
We rst consider the case when b exceeds rg by a large amount, or product value is high:
b > 11 rg:
Proposition 1 When b > 11 rg; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which
each rm prices according to mixed strategy
F (p;; rf ) =
8>>><>>>:
(1  )F1 (p;) if t1  p < rf
(1  ) if rf  p < t2
1  + F2 (p;) if t2  p  b
; (6)
and global searchers adopt reservation price rf ; where t1 < rf < t2 < b;
F1(p;) =
1
1  
8<:1 
"
(1  ) (1  )
N

b
p
  1

   (1  )
 
1  N
N (1  )
# 1
N 1
9=; ; (7)
F2(p;) = 1  1


(1  ) (1  )
N (+  (1  ))(
b
p
  1)
 1
N 1
; (8)
t1 = b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  ) ; (9)
t2 = b
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) +NN 1 (+   ) ; (10)
and  2 (0; 1) and rf satisfy
rf = b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  )N 1 ; (11)
(1  )
Z rf
t1
(rf   p)dF1(p;) = s: (12)
Each rms equilibrium prot is b (1 )(1 )N : Furthermore, rf > rg; and F (p; ) < G (p; )
so that both the expected price and the expected minimum price in the market are higher
under F (p; ) than under G (p; ) : Local searchers have lower expected surplus than global
searchers, and welfare of all consumers is lower when  < 1 than when  = 1:
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We notice several interesting features of the equilibrium:
First, the equilibrium price distribution is a mixture distribution consisting of two sepa-
rate cumulative distribution functions, F1(p;) and F2(p;); playing them randomly with
respective probabilities 1  and ; and a gap exists between the upper limit of the support
for F1 and the lower limit of the support for F2. Both  and rf are functions of b and are
determined endogenously. In equilibrium, with probability ; each rm will price above
rf according to c.d.f. F2; and in doing so it targets the local searchers (and can sell to
the other consumers only when the other rm has also priced above rf ): With probability
1   ; each rm will price below rf according to c.d.f. F1: Given the reservation price rf
of the global searchers, a rm is guaranteed to sell to at least 1N of them if pricing at rf ;
the upper limit of the support for F1; whereas with a slight increase of the price above rf it
will lose sales to all the global searchers if another rm prices at or below rf ; which occurs
with probability 1   N 1 > 0: Thus, the lower limit of support for F2; which achieves
the same expected prot as b (the upper limit of the support for both F2 and F ); must be
discretely higher than rf : when raising its price above rf ; a rms demand jumps down,
which must be exactly o¤set by a jump-up of the price so that the rms expected prot
remains the same. Consequently, an interval of prices (rf < p < t2) on the support of the
equilibrium distribution F will be played with zero probability. This clustered equilibrium
price distribution is in sharp contrast to the usual unclustered price distribution found in
the literature.
Second, in equilibrium, since both rms will price above rf with a positive probability;
global searchers may search more than once before purchasing; so there is true equilibrium
sequential search. This is in contrast to Stahl (1989), where in equilibrium all searchers
only search once before purchase.
Third, the connement to searching only one seller is costly to the local searchers, making
their expected surplus lower than that of the global searchers. This is true because of
both a direct e¤ect and a strategic e¤ect. Directly, they pay a higher expected price
given the equilibrium price distribution, compared to the global searchers who have a lower
reservation price. Indirectly, the presence of the local searchers encourages rms to raise
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prices strategically, resulting in an equilibrium price distribution with a higher expected
price. As a result, the local searchers will have a lower expected surplus than the global
searchers, even though they may incur a search cost in equilibrium.
Finally, the presence of local searchers exerts a negative externality on the global searchers
and the informed consumers by raising the expected prices they will pay.
We illustrate the equilibrium distribution of Proposition 1 in the example below.
Example 1 Suppose that N = 3;  = 0:5;  = 0:5; s = 0:5:Then rg = 1: 26, and 11 rg = 2:
53: Let b = 5:We nd  = 0:27 and rf = 1: 79: The equilibrium price distribution is
F (p) =
8>>><>>>:
1  1:38
q
0:83
p   0:39 if 0:6  p < 1: 79
0:27 if 1: 79  p < 3
1  3:65
q
0:56
p   0:11 if 3  p  5
:
Its density function, shown in Figure 1, is
f (p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0:42
p2
q
0:83
p
 0:39
if 0:6  p < 1: 79
0 if 1: 79  p < 3
0:28
p2
q
0:56
p
 0:11
if 3  p  5
:
0 1 2 3 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Figure 1
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We next consider the case where b exceeds rg by a relatively small amount.
Proposition 2 When rg  b  11 rg; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in
which rms set prices according to G(p; rg), and global searchers adopt reservation price
rg: Each rms equilibrium prot is
1 
N rg: In equilibrium, local searchers have the same
expected surplus as global searchers, and the presence of local searchers has no e¤ect on the
equilibrium outcome.
Remarkably, when the local searchersreservation price exceeds rg by a relatively small
amount (which can be large if  is large), their presence has no e¤ect on the equilibrium price
distribution, which remains to be G (p; rg) ; same as if all searchers were global searchers. In
such situations, Stahl (1989)s analysis is entirely valid. Intuitively, even though the local
searchers reservation price exceeds that of the low-cost searchers, since the di¤erence is
relatively smalleither because b is close to rg or because  is large, rmsprice strategy is
driven by the consideration of global searchersreservation price. Consequently, the local
searchers have the same expected search outcomes as global searchers. Firm conduct and
market performance are not a¤ected by their presence. The global searchers exert a positive
externality on the local searchers: rms do not want to lose sales to the global searchers
by pricing above rg; which, given that rg  b; means that having the reservation price at b
is equivalent to setting it at rg in equilibrium. Example 2 below illustrates the equilibrium
price distribution in Proposition 2.
Example 2 Everything is the same as in Example 1 except 1: 26  b  2:53; where 1:26 =
rg and 2:53 = 11 rg:The equilibrium price distribution is
G (p) = 1 
r
0:42
p
  0:33 with 0:32  p  1:26:
Its density function, shown in Figure 2, is
g (p) =
0:21
p2
q
1:26
p   0:33
with 0:32  p  1: 26:
12
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Finally, we consider the case where b is lower than rg: For b < rg; letH(p; b) and rh  rh (b)
satisfy
H(p; b) = 1 

1  
N
(
b
p
  1)
 1
N 1
with
1  
1  +Nb  p  b; (13)Z b
1 
1 +N b
(rh   p)dH(p; b) = s; (14)
Given that rg exists uniquely, it is straightforward to verify that rh exists uniquely for any
given b > 0: The result below establishes the unique existence of some b^ 2 (0; rg) ; which is
by assumption the lowest possible value for b:
Lemma 2 For any given  < 1; if b < rg; then b < rh < rg; 0 < r0h (b) < 1; and there exists
a unique b^ 2 (0; rg) such that b^ = rh

b^

; with b > rh (b) if b > b^ and b < rh (b) if b < b^:
The next result shows that if b 2

b^; rg

; then the equilibrium price distribution and
global searchers reservation price are given by (13) and (14).
Proposition 3 Suppose that rg > b  b^  rh

b^

: Then, there exists a unique symmet-
ric equilibrium, in which rms set prices according to H(p; b) and global searchers adopt
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reservation price rh; where H(p; b) and rh  rh (b) satisfy (13) and (14). Each rms
equilibrium prot is b1 N ; lower than when  = 1: In equilibrium, local searchers have the
same expected surplus as global searchers, and the presence of local searchers increases all
consumerswelfare.
Interestingly, when local searchersreservation price is below rg, global searchers choose
their optimal reservation price above the upper limit of the support for the equilibrium
price distribution. In other words, rms always price strictly below the global searchers
reservation price. While the rmspricing strategy may seem counter-intuitive, it is easier
to understand once the presence of local searchers is taken into account. Since b < rh but
the di¤erence is relatively small; a rm would want to lower its price to b or below in order
to sell to the local searchers it would not be protable for the rm to raise its price to rh:
Although local searchers reservation price is below that of the global searchers, all
searchers have the same expected search outcomes and expected payo¤s. This is simi-
lar to the case when b exceeds rg by a small amount. The di¤erence is that here rms
change their pricing strategy in response to the reservation price of local searchers, and all
consumers are better o¤ compared to the equilibrium where  = 1: So this is a case where
(low-valuation) local searchers exert a positive externality on global searchers.
Example 3 below illustrates the equilibrium price distribution in Proposition 3.
Example 3 Everything is the same as in Example 1 except b = 0:6: We rst compute
b^ = 0:36: Recall that rg = 1: 26: The equilibrium price distribution is
H(p; b) = 1 
r
0:17
p
  0:33 with 0:15  p  0:6:
Its density function, shown in Figure 3, is
h (p) =
0:1
p2
q
0:2
p   0:33
with 0:15  p  0:6:
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4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
Our analysis has shown how the nature of equilibrium changes with b: When b exceeds rg
by a relatively large amount; global searchers set reservation price rf > rg and rms adopt
clustered pricing. When b exceeds rg by a small amount, global searchers set reservation
price rg and rms price as if there were no local searchers. When b is lower than rg (but by
a limited amount), global searchersreservation price will be rh < rg; and rms will price
lower than if local searchers were not present.
The comparative statics on b suggests an empirically testable prediction. Since V  rg; we
can consider situations where b > rg1  as having a high-value product, and situations where
b  rg1  as having a low-value product, relative to the search cost s. From Propositions 1,
2, and 3, we immediately have:
Corollary 1 Given  2 (0; 1) ; for high-value products, rms tend to adopt clustered pric-
ing, randomizing between clusters of high and low prices while avoiding intermediate prices;
and for low-value products, rms tend to adopt unclustered pricing, with a price distribution
that has positive density on its entire support.
15
We next discuss how other parameters of the model, s; ; and ; a¤ect market outcomes.
Let r be global searchersequilibrium reservation price, p the expected market price,  the
equilibrium prot of each rm; w each consumers welfare, and W  aggregate consumer
welfare. We rst consider the e¤ects of search cost s.
Corollary 2 Holding all else constant:
(i) dpds > 0 if b 2 [rg; 11 rg):
(ii) It is possible that dpds < 0 if b >
rg
1  ; in particular,
dp
ds < 0 if b >
rg
1  and N = 2:
(iii) dw

ds < 0 for all consumers if b 2 [rg; rg1 ) but it is possible that dW

ds > 0 if b >
rg
1  ;
and a lower s need not reduce :
(iv) As s! 0;  does not converge to 0; and price dispersion persists:
When b exceeds rg by a relatively small amount, the equilibrium price distribution is the
same as in Stahl (1989), and a decrease in search cost has the familiar e¤ect on equilibrium
price and consumer welfare, lowering p and raising w. It is surprising, however, that a
reduction in search cost can raise the expected price in the market and reduce aggregate
consumer welfare when b exceeds rg by a large amount. To see the intuition behind this
result, recall that when b > rg1  ; in equilibrium rms randomize between a set of high
prices targeting the local searchers and a set of low prices targeting the global searchers. As
s becomes lower, the global searchers lower their reservation price, reducing the expected
payo¤ from trying to sell to them. Firms thus nd more protable to target the local
searchers, placing a higher probability on the interval of high prices. Consequently, the
expected price in the market is higher. This can lead to higher expected price for all
consumers, reducing aggregate consumer welfare.11
Price dispersion persists in our model even as s vanishes, because there are local searchers
whose reservation price is b > 0; and b > rg1  as s ! 0 (rg ! 0): In fact, as s ! 0; the
equilibrium price distribution in our model converges to that in Varian (1980) with the
11Since the global searchers benet from the lower search cost, our numerical examples show that they
are better o¤ from the lower search cost, despite the higher expected price. The local searchers and the
informed consumers are worse o¤ due to the higher prices.
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number of uninformed consumers becoming (1  ) (1  ) : The presence of local searchers
also means that a reduction in s need not lower equilibrium rm prot; and for given b > 0;
equilibrium prot remains positive as s vanishes.
Corollary 2 o¤ers an explanation of the puzzling observation that the Internet, which has
substantially reduced search cost, has not signicantly reduced prices and price dispersions
for many products (e.g., Baye and Morgan, 2004; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2006; and
Ellison and Ellison, 2005). Our theory suggests that this can happen if there are local
searchers whose reservation price is above rg. These may be consumers who lack the access
to the new search technology made available by the Internet and hence their search cost
remains high. Thus even as other consumers who search on the Internet have reduced their
search cost dramatically, equilibrium price dispersion remains. In this sense, the so-called
"Digital Divide" is not only an equity issue but also has important implications for market
e¢ ciency.
Next, we consider the e¤ects of changes in the portion of global searchers () among
uninformed consumers: Recall that the equilibrium price distribution is denoted by  () ;
and the equilibrium price distributions in Varian (1980) and in Stahl (1989) are denoted by
F v () and G () ; respectively:
Corollary 3 (i) An increase in  lowers p and  while benets all consumers when the
higher  moves the parameter region from b > rg1  to
rg
1  > b > rg; and an increase in
 has no e¤ect on market outcomes if b^ < b  rg1  : (ii)  (p) ! F v () if  ! 0; and
 (p)! G () if ! 1:
As one would expect, an increase in the number of global searchers tends to reduce market
prices and benet consumers. This happens when b  rg1  and an increase in  changes
the nature of the equilibrium price distribution. Numerical analysis suggests that this is
also the case for a marginal increase in  when b > rg1  ; although we have not been able to
show this analytically. However, it is also possible that a higher  does not lower prices, as
in the case when b  rg1  .
To the extent that the portion of local searchers (e.g., consumers who have no access to
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computers or the Internet) may decrease over time, or  may increase over time, our result
suggests that as time passes, prices on the Internet might become less dispersed and become
closer to marginal cost.
Corollary 3 implies that the equilibrium in Varian (1980) is a limiting case of our model
when  ! 0; while the equilibrium in Stahl (1989) with unit demand is a special case of
our model either when ! 1.
Next, changes in the portion of informed consumers () have expected e¤ects; as in the
following:
Corollary 4 (i) d

d < 0; and (ii) p! 0 and  ! 0 as ! 1:
Thus, more informed consumers result in lower equilibrium prots. As all consumers
approach to being fully informed, prices approach marginal cost and rm prots approach
zero.
Finally, we can nd out the limiting distribution when N goes to innite. Let  (p) denote
the degenerate probability distribution with unit mass at p. We have:
Corollary 5 As N !1;  (p)!  (V ) if b  V and  (p)!  (b) if V > b.
Therefore, as N grows large, in the limit the equilibrium price distribution collapse to the
local searchersor the global searchersproduct valuation, whichever is smaller, consistent
with the ndings of Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989). Intuitively, as N ! 1; the price
distribution G () will concentrate at the reservation price rg because the probability of
being the rm with lowest price diminishes to zero. The concentration of prices increases
the reservation price as search benet decreases, which in turn increases the incentive for
rms to set higher prices. As a result, rg converges to V and G () converges to  (V ) :
Similarly, as N !1; the price distribution H () converges to  (b). Furthermore, since by
assumption b < V1  ; as N !1 we must have b < rg1  due to rg ! V: Hence, if b > V; as
N !1 we have rg1  > b > rg and  (p) = G (p)!  (V ) ; if b < V;  (p) = H (p)!  (b) ;
and if b = V;  (p)!  (V ) =  (b) :
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5. DISCUSSIONS
Like the uninformed consumers in Varian (1980), the local searchers in our model can
have two alternative interpretations. All of our formal results in Sections 3 and 4 are valid
whether the local searchers search only once because of high search cost or of some behavioral
search rule.12 We now discuss the implications of our result, focusing on the interpretation
that the local searchers are boundedly rational they have the same search cost s as the
global searchers but their reservation price is not derived from optimal sequential search.
This connects our analysis closely to a small but growing literature that considers bounded
rationality in the study of industrial organization.13 From Propositions 2 and 3, we have:
Corollary 6 Suppose that the local searchers are boundedly rational in choosing their reser-
vation price b. If the degree of departures from optimal search is relatively small in the
market (in the sense that rg1   b  b^); then the BR searchers will have the same expected
payo¤s as rational searchers, and the equilibrium outcome is either the same as or is better
for all consumers than that when all consumers are fully rational.
Our nding is in contrast to the result in many other models that BR consumers are
always harmed by their non-optimizing behavior in equilibrium (e.g., Armstrong and Chen,
2009; Gabaix and Laibson. 2006; and Spiegler, 2006). Unlike in these models, in our model
a small degree of non-optimizing behavior by some consumers is harmless and can benet
all consumers. Thus, BR searchers can have a positive externality on rational searchers and
informed consumers.
However, when the departure from optimal search is relatively large, with b > rg1  ; non-
optimizing search behavior is costly to the BR searchers, reducing their welfare below that
12As long as s is not too large, we will have s < b^  b; and hence the search rule of having the reservation
price at b is not irrational, but is boundedly rational, since any b 2 (s; V ] is rationalizable under some market
price distribution. Furthermore, as we have seen from Propostions 2 and 3, for b 2
h
b^;
rg
1 
i
; althouth b 6= rg;
it is e¤ectively optimal to choose b as the reservation price in equilibrium.
13See Armstrong and Chen (2008), Baye and Morgan (2004), Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
and Spiegler (2006) for examples of recent work, and Ellison (2006) for an insightful review of the literature.
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of the rational searchers. Furthermore, the presence of BR searchers now exerts a negative
externality on rational searchers and informed consumers by encouraging rms to raise
prices. We thus have:
Corollary 7 If the degree of departures from optimal search is relatively large in the market,
with b > rg1  ; then the BR searchers will have lower expected surplus than rational searchers,
and their presence makes all consumers worse o¤.
We have conned our analysis to the three cases of b > rg1  ;
rg
1   b  rg; and rg > b  b^.
Since b is local searchersproduct valuation and since V  rg, it is appropriate to assume
that b is not too much smaller than rg: There is another motivation to conne our analysis
to b  b^: If b < b^; it can be shown that the equilibrium will depend on whether searchers
with the exogenous reservation price b are (i) optimal searchers with (prohibitively) high
search cost or (ii) BR searchers whose reservation price is b: under (i), in equilibrium these
searchers will still search only once in equilibrium; but under (ii) they may search multiple
sellers if b is low. The equilibrium will still be in mixed strategies, but the equilibrium price
distribution would depend on which interpretation we adopt. Our purpose in this paper is
to develop a theory of equilibrium price dispersion that is robust to alternative (plausible)
interpretations of consumer behavior. We thus wish to avoid conclusions that are driven
by (or are only valid under) a specic view of consumer behavior. This is accomplished by
assuming b  b^.
6. CONCLUSION
We have developed a simple search model that unies two di¤erent approaches of studying
homogeneous-product markets with imperfect consumer information. Our analysis suggests
that including the two types of searchers from Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) in a single
model yields interesting new insights about oligopolistic pricing. Most strikingly, equilib-
rium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated
by a zero-density gap in the middle; and a reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher
market prices. The equilibrium price distribution is robust with respect to alternative in-
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terpretations of the heterogeneous searchers. Under a boundedly rational interpretation for
the local searchers, a small degree of bounded rationality in the market either has no e¤ect
on equilibrium outcomes or benets all consumers while reducing rm prots. Furthermore,
our analysis provides the testable empirical implication that rms tend to adopt clustered
pricing for high-value products but unclustered pricing for low-value products.
While our mixture-distribution equilibrium is in contrast with the standard result in the
literature (e.g., Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989) that the equilibrium price distribution is gapless,
the existence of such an equilibrium requires certain conditions. In our specic model,
we have identied plausible conditions under which the equilibrium price distribution does
or does not have a gap. More generally, our analysis suggests that the nature of price
distribution will be sensitive to the specications of consumer search costs as well as to
other market conditions.14
For future research, it would be interesting to extend our model to study markets with
horizontal product di¤erentiation. It would also be interesting to study how rms might
separate the local searchers from the global searchers in order to engage in price discrimina-
tion. Another direction for future research is to extend our model to settings where there is
information imperfection in multiple dimensions, such as in both price and product quality.
Also, it would be desirable to empirically test our models prediction concerning how the
nature of products a¤ects the nature of equilibrium price dispersions, and more generally
to understand empirically price dispersions in di¤erent markets.
14When the number of rms is large, our mixture-distribution equilibrium can be alternatively interpreted
as an asymmetric equilibrium where  portion of the rms price higher according to F2 whereas 1   
portion of the rms price lower according to F1: This suggests that high-price stores and low-price stores
might coexist persistently, with price dispersion among each type of stores.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 1. We verify that F (p; ) is a c.d.f. Since F1(rf ; ) = 1; F2(t2; ) = 0; F1(p; )
and F2(p; ) increase in p; it follows that F (p; ) is continuous and weakly increases in p:
Furthermore, F (t1; ) = (1  )F1(t1; ) = 0; and F (b; ) = 1   + F2(b; ) = 1: Therefore
F (p; ) is a continuous c.d.f.
Step 2. We show that each rm is optimizing following F (p; ); given that other rms
choose prices according to F , local searchersreservation price is b; and global searchers
reservation price is rf : The expected prot when a rm chooses price p is:
(i) If t1 < p  rf ;
 = p
"
(1  ) (1  )
N
+  (1  )
N 1X
i=0
 
N 1
i

N 1 i(1  )i
i+ 1
#
+p
N 1X
i=0

N   1
i

N 1 i(1  )i (1  F1(p; ))i
= p
"
(1  ) (1  )
N
+
 (1  )  1  N
N (1  ) + (+ (1  ) (1  F1(p; )))
N 1
#
;
because the rm sells to (1 )(1 )N of local searchers with probability 1; to
(1 )
i+1 of
global searchers when i other rms also price below rf (which occurs with probability 
N 1
i

N 1 i(1   )i); and also to all informed consumers () when its price is lowest
(which occurs with probability [+ (1  ) (1  F1(p; ))]N 1). The equality above then
follows from operations of combinations.
(ii) If t2  p < b;
 = p

(1  ) (1  )
N
+ [ (1  ) + ]N 1(1  F2(p; ))N 1

;
because the rm sells to (1 )(1 )N of local searchers with probability 1 and to all global
searchers and informed consumers with probability N 1(1   F2(p; ))N 1 (when p is the
lowest price).
(iii) If p = rf ;  = rf (
(1 )(1 )
N +
(1 )(1 N)
N(1 ) + 
N 1):
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(iv) If p = b;  = b (1 )(1 )N :
Equal prots from (i) and (iii) yield
F1(p;; rf )
=
1 

N 1 +

(1 )(1 )
N +
(1 )(1 N)
N(1 ) + 
N 1

rf
p   1
 1N 1
1   ; (15)
which, after substituting rf from (11), yields equation (7), where t1 is given by equation
(9). Equal prots from (ii) and (iv) yield equation (8), where t2 is given by equation (10).
And equal prots from (iii) and (iv) yield the expression for rf ; equation (11). Note that
t1  rf  t2  b. Therefore, the rm is optimizing choosing prices p 2 [t1; b] according
to F (p; ) : Moreover, global searchers will search optimally, which gives equation (12), and
the assumption that b < 11 V ensures that rf < V .
Step 3. We show the existence of  2 (0; 1) : Substituting rf ; t1; and F1 as functions of
 and b into the left-hand side of equation (12), which can then be denoted as
  (; b)  (1  )
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
F1(p;; rf (; b))dp: (16)
  is a continuous function of ; for any given b (and given all other parameter values):
Thus, the proposed pricing strategy F and the search strategy rf constitute an equilibrium
if there exists some  2 (0; 1) that solves   (; b) = s: Since
@rf (; b)
@b
=
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  )N 1 > 0
and for p 2 [t1; rf ]
@F1(p;)
@rf
=
@F1(p;)
@p

  p
rf

>  @F1(p;)
@p
; (17)
we have
@  (; b)
@b
= (1  ) @rf (; b)
@b
+ (1  )
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1(p;)
@rf
@rf (; b)
@b
dp
= (1  ) @rf (; b)
@b
"
1 +
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1(p;)
@rf
dp
#
> (1  ) @rf (; b)
@b
"
1 
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1(p;)
@p
dp
#
= 0:
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If  = 0; we would have b = 11 rg from equations (11), (7), and (3). Thus, for b >
1
1 rg,
  (; b) > s if  = 0, and   (; b) = 0 < s if  = 1: Hence for any b 2 ( 11 rg;

1 + 1 

V ];
there exists some  2 (0; 1) that solves   (; b) = s:
Step 4. We establish equilibrium uniqueness. It is straightforward to verify that F is the
only possible symmetric equilibrium price strategy of the game given any . The uniqueness
of the equilibrium is then established if, for any given b;  (b) uniquely solves   (; b) = s;
which would be true if  (b) is monotonically increasing in b: Rewriting
F1 =
1
1  
h
1 A 1N 1
i
;
where from (15)
A  N 1 +
 
N 1 +
(1  ) (1  )
N
+
(1  )  1  N
N (1  )
!
rf
p
  1

> 0;
we have @A@ > 0 and
@F1
@
=
1
(1  )2
h
1 A 1N 1
i
  1
1  
1
N   1A
1
N 1 1@A
@
=
F1
(1  )  
1
1  
1
N   1
1  (1  )F1
A
@A
@
:
Thus
(1  )@F1
@
  F1 =   1
N   1
1  (1  )F1
A
@A
@
< 0: (18)
Therefore
@  (; b)
@
=  
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
F1(p;; rf (; b))dp+ (1  )
"
@rf (; b)
@
+
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)

@F1
@
+
@F1
@rf
@rf
@

dp
#
=
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)

(1  )@F1
@
  F1(p;; rf (; b))

dp+ (1  )@rf (; b)
@
 
1 +
Z rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1
@rf
dp
!
< 0;
because @rf (;b)@ < 0 from (11), 1 +
R rf (;b)
t1(;b)
@F1
@rf
dp > 0 from (17), and (1   )@F1@  
F1(p;; rf (; b)) < 0 from (18). It follows that
d (b)
db
=  
@ (;b)
@b
@ (;b)
@
> 0: (19)
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Step 5. We show rf > rg by proving the two claims below
Claim 1. rf must be monotonic in b.
Suppose to the contrary that rf is non-monotonic in b. By the continuity of rf in b, there
will be some b 6= ~b associated with some common rf . Suppose b > ~b: Then  > ~ from (19)
and t1 > ~t1 from (9) and (11). Thus, using (15) for F1,
s = (1  )
Z rf
t1
F1(p;; rf (b))dp
=
Z rf
t1
0@1  "N 1 + (1  ) (1  )
N
+
 (1  )  1  N
N (1  ) + 
N 1
!
rf
p
  1
# 1N 11A dp
<
Z rf
~t1
0@1  "~N 1 + (1  ) (1  )
N
+
 (1  )  1  ~N
N (1  ~) + ~
N 1
!
rf
p
  1
# 1N 11A dp
= (1  ~)
Z rf
~t1
F1

p; ~; rf

~b

dp = s;
a contradiction.
Claim 2. rf cannot be decreasing in b for all b  11 rg.
Suppose to the contrary that rf monotonically decreases in b. Then rf < rg when
b > 11 rg. But, since
(1 N)
1  =
PN 1
n=0 
n,
rf = b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) (1  ) +  (1  ) (1  N ) +N (1  )N 1
= b
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) +  (1  )PN 1n=0 n +NN 1
> b
(1  ) (1  )
(1  ) (1  ) +  (1  )N +N > rg;
when b > ~b = (1 )(1 )+(1 )N+N(1 )(1 ) rg; a contradiction.
Together, Claim 1 and Claim 2 imply that rf monotonically increases in b; and hence
rf > rg for b > 11 rg:
Finally, F2 < F1; and F1 < G because
G  F1 =   
1   +

N 1 +

(1 )(1 )
N +
(1 )(1 N)
N(1 ) + 
N 1

rf
p   1
 1N 1
1  
 

1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
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>   
1   +
1
1  

N 1 +
1  
N

rf
p
  1
 1
N 1
 

1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 )
 1
N 1
>   
1   +
1
1  
 
N 1
 1
N 1 +
h
1 
N

rf
p   1
i 1
N 1  
h
1 
N (
rg
p   1 )
i 1
N 1
1   > 0:
Thus F rst-order stochastically dominates G: It follows that the distribution of the min-
imum prices under F (); 1  [1  F ()]N ; also rst-order stochastically dominates the dis-
tribution of minimum prices under G () ; 1   [1 G ()]N : Therefore, both the expected
price and the expected minimum price are higher under F than under G; and all consumers
are worse o¤ compared to the situation where  = 1: Local searches have lower surplus
than global searchers, since with positive probability they have di¤erent search outcomes.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given G(p; rg); the global searchers are searching optimally with
reservation price rg: To show that the proposed is an equilibrium, we thus only need to show
that, given b and rg; and given other rms choose G(p; rg); each rm is optimizing choosing
any p 2
h
1 
1+(N 1)rg; rg
i
: For any such price, the rms expected prot is
p
1  
N
+ p (1 G(p; rg))N 1
= p
1  
N
+ p
1  
N
(
rg
p
  1 ) = 1  
N
rg:
Then, the most protable deviation is p = b; because any p > b would lead to zero prot
and any p 2 (rg; b) would result in the same amount of sales as p = b but at a lower price.
However, prot at p = b is
(1  ) (1  )
N
b  (1  ) (1  )
N
1
1  rg =
1  
N
rg:
Therefore the rm is maximizing its prot by choosing its price from G(p; rg); and each
rms equilibrium prot is 1 N rg:
Furthermore, from familiar arguments there can be no other equilibrium price distribu-
tion. The uniqueness of rg then implies that there can be no other symmetric equilibrium.
Since b  rg; local searchers always have the same search outcomes as global searchers;
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and since the equilibrium distribution is identical to that when  = 1, the presence of local
searchers has no e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. From (14) and (3), we have
rh  
Z b
1 
1 +N b
pdH(p; b) = rg  
Z rg
1 
1 +N rg
pdG(p; rg) = s;
and thus rh < rg since G(p; rg) < H(p; b) for b < rg: Also, for b < rg; if rh  b; we would
have
s =
Z b
1 
1 +N b
(rh   p)dH(p; b) 
Z b
1 
1 +N b
(b  p)dH(p; b)
<
Z rg
1 
1 +N rg
(rg   p)dH(p; rg) = s;
where the last inequality follows from (4). This is a contradiction. Therefore, if b < rg;
b < rh < rg.
Rewriting (14) as
(rh   b) +
Z b
1 
1 +N b
H(p; b)dp = s;
we have
0 < r0h (b) = 1 
d
R b
1 
1 +N b
H(p; b)dp
db
= 1  1 
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dH(p; b)
db
dp =  
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dH(p; b)
dp

 p
b

dp
=
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dH(p; b)
dp
p
b

dp <
Z b
1 
1 +N b
dH(p; b)
dp
dp = 1:
From 0 < r0h (b) < 1; together from b  rh if b ! rg and b < rh if b ! 0; there is some
b^ 2 (0; rg) that uniquely solves b^ = rh

b^

; with b > rh (b) if b > b^ and b < rh (b) if
b < b^: Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, H(p; b) is a continuous c.d.f., with H( 1 1 +Nb; b) = 0;
H(b; b) = 1; G(p; rg) < H(p; b) for b < rg; and H(p; b) = G(p; rg) if b = rg: Given that
all other rms follow the strategy H(p; b) and given r and b, if a rm charges any p 2
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h
1 
1 +Nb; b
i
; its expected prot is
p
1  
N
+ p [1 H(p; b)]N 1 = b1  
N
:
Furthermore, if it prices below 1 1 +Nb or above rh; its expected prot would be lower
than b1 N ; and if it prices between b and rh; since rh  b for b  b; its expected prot
would be
p
 (1  )
N
 rh (1  )
N
 b

 (1  )
N
= b
1  
N
:
Thus each rm is optimizing by choosing mixed strategy H(p; b):
Next, expecting price distribution H(p; b); it is optimal for global searchers to search
with reservation price rh. Therefore the proposed pricing and search strategies indeed
constitute an equilibrium, with  = b1 N ; and there is no other symmetric equilibrium.
Since b < rg; b
1 
N < rg
1 
N ; and thus rm prot is lower than when  = 1: Given rms
equilibrium pricing strategy, local consumers have the same search outcome as the global
searchers, and thus have the same expected surplus in equilibrium.
Finally, since G(p; rg) < H(p; b); the expected price is lower under H(p; b): Moreover,
since the distributions of the minimum price in the market are 1   [1 G(p; rg)]N and
1 [1 H(p; b)]N ; respectively, which preserves the stochastic ordering, the expected lowest
price is also lower under H(p; b): Thus all consumers are better o¤ due to the presence of
the local searchers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. (i) If b 2 [rg; 11 rg); a marginal reduction in s reduces r from (5)
and hence increases G (p; ) from (2), lowering p.
(ii) It su¢ ces to show that dpds < 0 if b >
1
1 rg and N = 2: From Proposition 1, when
N = 2:
p = E [pjF ] = (1  )E [pjF1] + E [pjF2]
= (1  ) (1 + ) (1  ) + 2
2 (1  ) rf ln
rf
t1
+ 

(1  ) (1  )
2 (+  (1  ))b ln
b
t2

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=
b (1  ) (1  )
2
ln

(1 + ) (1  ) + 2
(1 + ) (1  ) + 2

+
(1  ) (1  )
2 (+  (1  ))b ln
(1 +    (1  )) (1  ) + 2
(1  ) (1  ) :
Thus
dp
d
=
b (1  )2 (1  ) (1  )2 ( (1  ) + 2)
[(1  ) (1  + 2) + 2] [1 + +  (1  )] [(1  ) (1 + ) + 2] > 0:
(20)
From (12) and (9),
s = (1  ) (rf   E [pjF1]) = (1  )

rf   (1 + ) (1  ) + 2
2 (1  ) rf ln
rf
t1

= b
(1  ) (1  ) (1  )
(1 + ) (1  ) + 2  
b (1  ) (1  )
2
ln

(1 + ) (1  ) + 2
(1 + ) (1  ) + 2

:
Thus
ds
d
=   2b (1  ) (1  ) (1  ) (1  + + )
[1 + +  (1  )] (    2+   1)2 < 0: (21)
Therefore, from (20), (21), and the fact that there is one-to-one match between s and 
from the proof of Proposition 1, we have dds < 0 and
dp
ds
=
dp
d
d
ds
< 0:
(iii) A marginal reduction in s increases welfare for all consumers if b 2 [rg; 11 rg); since
it lowers both p and the expected minimum price in the market; but it can reduce W  if
b > 11 rg: For example, if N = 2;  = 0:5;  = 0:5; V = 6; b = 5; we have W
 = 4:
736 4 if s = 0:8 while W  = 4: 728 6 if s = 0:4. From Propositions (1), (2), and (3),
corresponding to the three connected and mutually exclusive regions of b values from large
to small, equilibrium prots are respectively (1 )(1 )N b;
1 
N rg; and
(1 )
N b. Both
(1 )
N b
and (1 )(1 )N b are not a¤ected by a reduction in s:
(iv) As s ! 0; rg ! 0 and hence b > 11 rg for any given b > 0. Thus, the equilibrium
price distribution will be F (p:) as s ! 0: Moreover, from (12), @@s < 0; and  ! 1 as
s! 0: Thus, as s! 0; F (p:)! F2 (p:) ; which is a non-degenerate c.d.f. , and each rms
equilibrium prot is (1 )(1 )N b > 0: Q.E.D.
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Proof of Corollary 3. (i) First, suppose initially b > 11 rg and the equilibrium price
distribution is F (p; ) : A higher  can move the parameter region to 11 rg > b > rg;
changing the equilibrium price distribution to G (p; ) > F (p; ) ; resulting in lower p and 
while beneting all consumers (who may also save on search costs in equilibrium). Second,
if b^ < b  rg1  ; then the equilibrium price distribution is either G () or H () ; which is
independent of :
(ii)As ! 0; b > 11 rg if b > rg; and from Proposition 1
 (p) = F (p)! 1 

(1  )
N
(
b
p
  1)
 1
N 1
= F v (p) :
On the other hand, as  ! 1; we have b < rg1  ; rms will ignore the local searchers and
 ()! G () : Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4. (i) for , we have three possible cases. If  = (1 )N b or
 = (1 )(1 )N b; then obviously
d
d < 0: If 
 = 1 N rg; then since
drg
d < 0 from (5), we
also have d

d < 0: (ii) as ! 1; the equilibrium price distribution converges to 0 (marginal
cost), and hence p! 0 and  ! 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 5. First, we show that, as N ! 1; rg ! V: The proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 4 in Stahl (1989). Note that, for p  rg  V;

rg
p   1

1 


is bounded away from zero. Thus, as N ! 1, from (2), G () ! 0: That is, as N ! 1;
G () concentrates at its upper bound: It follows that, as N ! 1; for any " > 0; we can
always nd some p0 arbitrarily close to rg such that G (p0) < : Suppose " is such that
p0 = rg   s+ V: Then, as N !1;Z rg
1 
1+(N 1) rg
G(p; rg)dp =
Z rg
p0
G(p; rg)dp+
Z p0
1 
1+(N 1) rg
G(p; rg)dp
<
 
rg   p0

+ 

p0   1  
1 + (N   1)rg

<
 
rg   p0

+ V = s;
which implies that the benet from search is smaller than s. Therefore, as N ! 1;
reservation price rg must approach to V:
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Next, Since b < 11 V by assumption, we must have b <
1
1 rg as N ! 1: If b > V; as
N ! 1;  (p) = G () !  (V ) : If b < V; as N ! 1; b < rg and  (p) = H (p) : But for
p < b;

b
p   1

1 


is bounded away from zero. Thus, as N !1, from (13), H (p)! 0:
Therefore, if b < V ,  (p) = H ()!  (b) as N !1:
Finally, if b = V;  (p)!  (V ) =  (b) as N !1: Q.E.D.
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